



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

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19 September 1946

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
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PAPER: (Establishment of a Channel Between the CIG and the JCS)

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

<u>CONSIGNEE</u>	<u>SIGNATURE</u>	<u>COPY NUMBER</u>	
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE		<u>1</u>	
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Advisory Council		<u>19</u>	
Legislative Liaison Branch		<u>20</u>	
Secretary, NIA		<u>29 thro 40</u>	
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS		<u>21</u>	
"A" Deputy		<u>22</u>	
"B" Deputy		<u>23</u>	
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AUTHENTICATION: 

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COPY NO. 16

13 September 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHANNEL BETWEEN THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Memorandum by the Secretary

At the request of the Chief of Naval Intelligence, the memorandum in Enclosure "A", together with subsequent correspondence in Enclosures "B" and "C", are circulated herewith for discussion at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Washington 25, D.C.  
Op-32X

22 August 1946

MEMORANDUM

From: Chief of Naval Intelligence  
To: Director of Central Intelligence  
Subject: Establishment of a Channel Between C.I.G.  
and the J.C.S.  
Enclosure: (A) Copy of Proposed Draft to accomplish above  
Subject.

1. It is requested that Enclosure (A) be placed on the agenda for discussion at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

2. A copy of Enclosure (A) has been forwarded to the Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee with the request that it be placed on the agenda for discussion at the next meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

/s/ THOS. B. INGLIS

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "A"

ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHANNEL BETWEEN THE CENTRAL  
INTELLIGENCE GROUP AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE PROBLEM

1. To establish a procedure for more effective handling of papers of the Central Intelligence Group by the Intelligence Advisory Board and to establish a channel between the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Group are all considering problems connected with intelligence. There is an established channel between the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for securing consideration of papers in which both have an interest (J.C.S. 1224/4 and 1224/5). There is no such channel between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Group. Recently the Central Intelligence Group prepared and secured action on N.I.A. 6 without reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who are also considering papers in this field, namely, J.C.S. 1664 and 1664/1.

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DISCUSSION

3. N.I.A. 6 and C.I.G. Directive [REDACTED] are papers that deal with subjects in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have an interest. As the Central Intelligence Group expands in the operation of intelligence activities, it is expected that it will be preparing more papers on subjects of interest to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The methods of handling such papers in the various agencies of the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board are not known. Even though they are submitted to the highest military command within each agency, it is submitted that there should be some procedure for securing action

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by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on those papers that deal with matters in which they have an interest. The permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board are the same as the members of the Joint Intelligence Committee. To have the Joint Intelligence Staff of the Joint Intelligence Committee act as the staff of the Intelligence Advisory Board in preparing action on Central Intelligence Group papers would result in securing joint action on these papers. Furthermore, when papers relating to matters of interest to the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considered by the Intelligence Advisory Board the permanent members thereof could forward their recommended action to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval or comment. This could be done via the established channel to the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Joint Intelligence Committee. Such procedure would assure coordination between the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and could be followed even though additional members were invited to sit when dealing with matters within their province. Such additional members could be invited to appoint ad hoc members of the Intelligence Advisory Staff. As the Central Intelligence Group expands in the field of static intelligence their assistance may be needed in connection with problems being considered by the Joint Intelligence Committee. When this situation occurs the above-mentioned channel could be used for securing such service.

CONCLUSION

4. It is concluded that there is at present a need for establishing a channel between the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which need will increase as the Central Intelligence Group expands its functions or activities. It is further concluded that such channel should be through the Joint Intelligence Committee.

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- 4 - Appendix to Enclosure "A"

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RECOMMENDATIONS

5. a. That the Joint Intelligence Staff be designated as the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Staff of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

b. That additional members of the Intelligence Advisory Board be invited to appoint ad hoc members to the Intelligence Advisory Staff.

c. That all Central Intelligence Group papers requiring consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Board be forwarded to the Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

d. That the Intelligence Advisory Staff (including ad hoc members when appropriate) be made responsible for securing final action by the Intelligence Advisory Board on papers presented by the Director of Central Intelligence.

e. That when appropriate the Joint Intelligence Committee (permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board) forward their recommended action on papers of the Central Intelligence Group to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval or comment.

f. That when appropriate in connection with current problems being considered by the Joint Intelligence Committee, they should request the assistance of the Central Intelligence Group.

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- 5 - Appendix to Enclosure "A"

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ENCLOSURE "B"

4 September 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Channel between C.I.G.  
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

REFERENCE: a. Memorandum from Chief of Naval Intelligence to  
Director of Central Intelligence, same subject,  
dated 22 August 1946, No. OP-32X.

b. N.I.A. Directive No. 1.

It is fully agreed that the present undetermined relation-  
ship between the C.I.G. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff requires  
early and comprehensive consideration.

It is not considered, however, that the proposal contained  
in the reference memorandum is appropriate since, pursuant to  
N.I.A. Directive No. 1, the Central Intelligence Group is con-  
stituted as a cooperative interdepartmental activity in which  
the interests of the State, War and Navy Departments are ade-  
quately and equitably represented. In addition, a full time  
staff for the Intelligence Advisory Board is not considered  
desirable since it implies that the I.A.B. must act unanimously  
as a body, whereas N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides that, if any  
member of the I.A.B. does not concur in a recommendation, it may  
nevertheless be submitted to the N.I.A. for decision.

It is, therefore, requested that, instead of pressing for  
the adoption by the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Intelli-  
gence Advisory Board of the recommendations contained in the  
reference memorandum, the Chief of Naval Intelligence sponsor a  
recommendation that each of those bodies concur that the Inter-  
departmental Coordinating and Planning Staff of C.I.G. and the  
Joint Intelligence Staff conduct a prompt and comprehensive  
joint study of the problem with recommendations for solution.

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The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff of the C.I.G. is being directed to assemble such material as may be currently available to it in preparation for such a joint study in all of its aspects.

HOYT S. VANDENBERG  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Director of Central Intelligence.

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Enclosure "B"

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ENCLOSURE "C"

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

11 September 1946

From: Chief of Naval Intelligence.  
To: Director of Central Intelligence.  
Subject: Establishment of a Channel Between CIG and the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
Reference: (a) DCI Memo re above Subject, dated 4 Sept. 1946.

1. The second paragraph of reference (a) is not fully understood. A "full time staff for I.A.B." was not suggested in my proposal; the Joint Intelligence Staff would act as such only part time and in addition to their present duties. My purpose is to provide a direct link, on the working level, between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Intelligence Authority. Present representation on C.I.G. is not questioned. Nor was any implication intended that unanimous action of the I.A.B. is required. It has always been understood that split opinions of the I.A.B. must be referred to N.I.A. for decision.

2. Your recommendation that the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff of the C.I.G. and the Joint Intelligence Staff conduct a prompt and comprehensive joint study of the problem and make recommendations for solution has merit. However, it is not desired to delay to that extent the discussion of this problem before the I.A.B. and the Joint Intelligence Committee. The present paper does not call for a vote on the proposed solution but for discussion of the problem. At that time it was expected that any member of the I.A.B. (including the Director of Central Intelligence) would present any other solution which he preferred over that proposed. If the first discussion of this problem is before the Joint Intelligence Committee I would be

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pleased to recommend to them that you be invited to attend and present your views. Or, if you prefer, I would be pleased to present to the Joint Intelligence Committee your views and preferred solution.

3. The Joint Intelligence Staff has already formally circulated my suggestion to the Joint Intelligence Committee. I prefer to let my suggestion to the I.A.B. stand and again request that it be included on the agenda for the next meeting of the I.A.B.

/s/ THOS. B. INGLIS.

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14 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Buford (State)  
Colonel Treacy (G-2)  
Captain Davis (ONI)  
Colonel Mussett (A-2)  
Captain Hyde (JIC)

SUBJECT: Relationship of C.I.G. to J.C.S.

ENCLOSURE: Extract from Minutes of 10th  
I.A.B. Meeting

The enclosed extract from Minutes of the last I.A.B. meeting is transmitted for information in connection with the meeting on this subject on Friday, 15 November.

**"SIGNED"**

JAMES S. LAY, JR.  
Secretary, N.I.A.

Distribution:  
Chief, ICAPS  
Secretary, NIA  
Executive Registry  
Central Records-2

JSL:IH

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13 November 1946

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MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. BUFORD  
COLONEL TREACY  
COLONEL MUSSETT

SUBJECT: Relationship of C.I.G. to J.C.S.

ENCLOSURE: Draft Proposal by O.N.I.

The enclosed draft proposal by the Office of Naval Intelligence is transmitted herewith for consideration at the Friday meeting on the relationship of C.I.G. to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.  
Secretary, N.I.A.

Distribution:  
Chief, ICAPS  
Secretary, N.I.A. ✓  
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BRIEF ON [REDACTED]

The second item on the agenda is [REDACTED] which involves the relationship between C.I.G. and the J.C.S. Discussion of this matter was deferred at a previous meeting, pending further consideration in each department. Particularly, General Chamberlin expressed a desire to discuss the matter with General Eisenhower.

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General Chamberlin, do you want to start the discussion on this subject?

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BRIEF ON [REDACTED]

(Establishment of a Channel Between  
the Central Intelligence Group and  
the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

3: *Oct*

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Admiral Inglis, as shown in the correspondence contained in [REDACTED] has raised the question of the relationship between C.I.G. and the J.C.S. C.I.G. has prepared a proposed directive on this subject which I believe you have all seen as the result of informal discussions with members of the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff. It is my understanding that this proposed directive is generally acceptable to you, and I would like to recommend your concurrence in its submittal to the N.I.A. and the J.C.S.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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**SECRET**

27 September 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. EDGAR:

I presented this subject to Colonel Carter Clarke on 23 September.

He read it subsequently and gave it to three of his staff for consideration. Two of them advised non-concurrence and one was undecided. He then presented it to General Chamberlin with recommendation that G-2 concur.

The Director of Intelligence, WDGS, directed the reply attached.

In a further conversation, Colonel Clarke made the following personal comments:

(1) He thought JIC should be abolished. (I explained that the main reason for retaining it was to continue its relationship with [REDACTED])

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(2) The Director of Central Intelligence should be a member of the JCS. He felt sure General Eisenhower would go along with this, but was doubtful of the Navy.

(3) This paper makes the Director of Central Intelligence Chairman of JIC, but does not make him a member of JIC.

(4) If (2) were accomplished, then the Director of Central Intelligence would have his deputy sitting on JIC and CIG should be in an echelon over JIC.

(5) That both General Chamberlin and he were entirely sympathetic with our proposal, but thought it did not go far enough.

(6) That in his opinion the paper should be presented as is to the IAB for consideration.

(7) That in his opinion the paper in its present or generally similar form would be approved by the IAB.

Recommendations

(1) That CIG's proposal be presented without change to the IAB for consideration at their next meeting.

(2) That these notes be brought to the attention of the Director of Central Intelligence.

**SECRET**

*W. M. Adams*  
W. M. ADAMS  
Colonel, GSC



WAR DEPARTMENT  
WAR DEPTMI GENERAL STAFF  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2  
WASHINGTON

25 September 1946

COLONEL ADAMS:

The attached papers have been informally studied here. It is believed that the paper has a fundamental weakness which may be summarized by the following comment:

Generally speaking the lines of responsibility lack definition. The Director, CIG, is designated as the Chief Intelligence Adviser of the JCS, yet the JCS has no authority over the Director, CIG. An external agency over which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have no control is interpolated between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and echelons thereof. This is violative of the usually accepted command relationship between a Commander and his Intelligence Officer and of the fundamental formula that intelligence is a function of command.

2 Incls  
Incl A  
Incl B

*CWJ*  
CARTER W. CLARKE  
Colonel, GSC  
Deputy Director of Intelligence

SECRET

D R A F T

ENCLOSURE "A"

CHARTER

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

ORGANIZATION

1. With the approval of the National Intelligence Authority (N.I.A.) and subject to its direction and control, the Director of Central Intelligence is hereby designated as the chief intelligence adviser to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. In performing this function, the Director of Central Intelligence will be advised and assisted by the Joint Intelligence Committee (J.I.C.).

MEMBERSHIP

3. The Joint Intelligence Committee will consist of:
  - a. The Director of Intelligence, War Department General Staff.
  - b. The Chief of Naval Intelligence.
  - c. The Assistant Chief of the Air Staff-2, U. S. Army Air Forces.
  - d. A representative of the Secretary of State.
4. The Director of Central Intelligence will preside at all meetings of the J.I.C.
5. Whenever a member of the J.I.C. is unable to act, he will appoint a deputy who shall have plenary powers.

FUNCTIONS

6. The Director of Central Intelligence, subject to the direction and control of the N.I.A. and with the advice and assistance of the J.I.C., shall:
  - a. Furnish intelligence for the use of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their supporting agencies, as requested or on his own initiative.
  - b. Advise and assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff on problems of intelligence policy and coordination within Joint Chiefs of Staff jurisdiction.

PROCEDURE

7. In performing the above functions, the Director of Central

Intelligence, advised and assisted by the J.I.C., shall:

- a. Establish his own methods of procedure.
- b. Maintain close liaison with the planning and policy formulating agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in order to make his services readily available in the preparation of studies and plans.
- c. Make full use of the staff and facilities of the intelligence agencies of the State, War and Navy Departments.

8. Prior to submission to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence will refer all reports, recommendations and intelligence estimates to the J.I.C. for concurrence or comment. Any recommendation which the Director of Central Intelligence and the J.I.C. approve unanimously and have the existing authority to execute may be put into effect without action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If any member of the J.I.C. does not concur, the Director of Central Intelligence will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the basis for such non-concurrence at the same time that the Director of Central Intelligence submits his report, recommendation or intelligence estimate.

9. The Secretariat, J.I.C., will be merged with the Secretariat, N.I.A., to insure coordination of Joint Chiefs of Staff and N.I.A. considerations in appropriate cases. This combined Secretariat will be composed of J.I.C. and N.I.A. sections to facilitate proper presentation to the respective committees and to permit such separation of activities as may be desirable in the national interest.

10. The present subcommittees of the J.I.C., including the Joint Intelligence Staff, will either be integrated into the Central Intelligence Group (C.I.G.) or operate under the coordination of the Director of Central Intelligence, whichever is agreed by the Director of Central Intelligence and the J.I.C. to be appropriate in each case, so as to create the most compact and efficient organization competent to meet the intelligence requirements of the N.I.A. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the

**RESTRICTED**

Director of Central Intelligence will maintain as a separate unit within the framework of C.I.G. such special activities as might be designated to serve solely the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

11. The members of the Joint Intelligence Committee will continue to serve as the US members of the Combined Intelligence Committee and will carefully coordinate their activities in this capacity with the Director of Central Intelligence.

12. The Director of Central Intelligence is authorized to request all Service and governmental agencies and activities for information and assistance which may be required in connection with the functions prescribed herein.

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D R A F T

ENCLOSURE "B"

DISCUSSION

1. The President's directive of 22 January 1946 directed that all Federal foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed and coordinated by the National Intelligence Authority so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the national security. Since all foreign intelligence activities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are related to the national security, such activities are subject to coordination by the National Intelligence Authority. Conversely, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have a direct interest in the activities of the National Intelligence Authority. Membership of Admiral Leahy on both the N.I.A. and the J.C.S. furnishes a direct link on the policy-making level.

2. In addition, the membership of the Intelligence Advisory Board to the Director of Central Intelligence is identical with that of the Joint Intelligence Committee. Experience, however, has shown that this link is inadequate in practice, since no provision exists for:

a. The Director of Central Intelligence, who acts for the N.I.A. to insure that its over-all policies and objectives are properly implemented and executed, to consider, or even be informed of, activities of the J.I.C.

b. The J.C.S. to be kept informed of N.I.A. activities in which they have an authorized interest.

3. In actual practice, the activities of the J.I.C. in their particular field are almost entirely duplicative of the activities of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Group. The functions of the J.I.C. are to:

a. Furnish intelligence for the use of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their supporting agencies, as directed or requested, or on its own initiative.

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Enclosure "B"

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b. Advise and assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff on problems of intelligence policy and coordination within Joint Chiefs of Staff jurisdiction.

The first of these functions is a duplication of the function of the Director of Central Intelligence to "accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security and the appropriate dissemination within the Government of the resulting strategic and national policy intelligence." This duplication was recognized by the N.I.A., in paragraph 2 of N.I.A. Directive No. 1, when it directed the C.I.G. to furnish strategic and national policy intelligence, as appropriate, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The second function of the J.I.C. duplicates the following functions of the Director of Central Intelligence:

a. To plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence agencies of the State, War and Navy Departments as relate to the national security (paragraph 3-b of the President's directive).

b. To act for the N.I.A. in coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security to insure that the over-all policies and objectives established by the N.I.A. are properly implemented and executed (paragraph 3 of N.I.A. Directive No. 5).

4. Therefore, in view of the fact that the functions of the J.I.C. are actually a part of the general functions of the Director of Central Intelligence, The Director of Central Intelligence should be designated the chief intelligence adviser to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In performing this function, however, the Director of Central Intelligence should be advised and assisted by the J.I.C., each member of which (except the State Department member) is an intelligence

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Enclosure "B"

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adviser to one of the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Specifically, no report, recommendation or intelligence estimate by the Director of Central Intelligence should be submitted to the J.C.S. until the concurrence or comment of the J.I.C. has been obtained and recorded.

5. To insure coordination of effort, the Secretariats of the N.I.A. and the J.I.C. should be merged, but retained in separate sections in order to facilitate proper presentation to the respective committees and to permit separation of activities where the fields of interest do not overlap or where military security requires segregation.

6. The present subcommittees of the J.I.C. should either be integrated into the C.I.G. where the functions fall wholly within the mission assigned to C.I.G., or operated under the supervision of the Director of Central Intelligence in his capacity as the chief intelligence adviser to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When requested by the J.C.S., the Director of Central Intelligence should maintain as a separate unit within the framework of C.I.G. such special activities as might be designated to serve wholly the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

7. The Joint Intelligence Committee should continue to serve as the U. S. members of the Combined Intelligence Committee, since it is undesirable that the Director of Central Intelligence become involved in any overt official relationships with foreign nations. Such relationships might endanger his independence or freedom of action, or adversely affect the objectivity of his intelligence estimates. The J.I.C., however, should be required to obtain the concurrence of the Director of Central Intelligence prior to taking action in the Combined Intelligence Committee.

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Enclosure "B"

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COPY NO. 29

18 September 1946

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHANNEL BETWEEN THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Memorandum by the Secretary

At the request of the Chief of Naval Intelligence, the memorandum in Enclosure "A", together with subsequent correspondence in Enclosures "B" and "C", are circulated herewith for discussion at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.

Secretary, N.I.A.

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ENCLOSURE "A"

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Op-32X Washington 25, D.C.

22 August 1946

MEMORANDUM

From: Chief of Naval Intelligence  
To: Director of Central Intelligence  
Subject: Establishment of a Channel Between C.I.G.  
and the J.C.S.  
Enclosure: (A) Copy of Proposed Draft to accomplish above  
Subject.

1. It is requested that Enclosure (A) be placed on the agenda for discussion at the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

2. A copy of Enclosure (A) has been forwarded to the Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee with the request that it be placed on the agenda for discussion at the next meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

/s/ THOS. B. INGLIS

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE "A"

ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHANNEL BETWEEN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP AND THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

THE PROBLEM

1. To establish a procedure for more effective handling of papers of the Central Intelligence Group by the Intelligence Advisory Board and to establish a channel between the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Central Intelligence Group are all considering problems connected with intelligence. There is an established channel between the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for securing consideration of papers in which both have an interest (J.C.S. 1224/4 and 1224/5). There is no such channel between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Group. Recently the Central Intelligence Group prepared and secured action on N.I.A. 6 without reference to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who are also considering papers in this field, namely, J.C.S. 1664 and 1664/1.

DISCUSSION

25X1A 3. N.I.A. 6 and C.I.G. Directive [REDACTED] are papers that deal with subjects in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have an interest. As the Central Intelligence Group expands in the operation of intelligence activities, it is expected that it will be preparing more papers on subjects of interest to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The methods of handling such papers in the various agencies of the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board are not known. Even though they are submitted to the highest military command within each agency, it is submitted that there should be some procedure for securing action

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by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on those papers that deal with matters in which they have an interest. The permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board are the same as the members of the Joint Intelligence Committee. To have the Joint Intelligence Staff of the Joint Intelligence Committee act as the staff of the Intelligence Advisory Board in preparing action on Central Intelligence Group papers would result in securing joint action on these papers. Furthermore, when papers relating to matters of interest to the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considered by the Intelligence Advisory Board the permanent members thereof could forward their recommended action to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval or comment. This could be done via the established channel to the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Joint Intelligence Committee. Such procedure would assure coordination between the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and could be followed even though additional members were invited to sit when dealing with matters within their province. Such additional members could be invited to appoint ad hoc members of the Intelligence Advisory Staff. As the Central Intelligence Group expands in the field of static intelligence their assistance may be needed in connection with problems being considered by the Joint Intelligence Committee. When this situation occurs the above-mentioned channel could be used for securing such service.

CONCLUSION

4. It is concluded that there is at present a need for establishing a channel between the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which need will increase as the Central Intelligence Group expands its functions or activities. It is further concluded that such channel should be through the Joint Intelligence Committee.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

5. a. That the Joint Intelligence Staff be designated as the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Staff of the Intelligence Advisory Board.

b. That additional members of the Intelligence Advisory Board be invited to appoint ad hoc members to the Intelligence Advisory Staff.

c. That all Central Intelligence Group papers requiring consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Board be forwarded to the Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

d. That the Intelligence Advisory Staff (including ad hoc members when appropriate) be made responsible for securing final action by the Intelligence Advisory Board on papers presented by the Director of Central Intelligence.

e. That when appropriate the Joint Intelligence Committee (permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board) forward their recommended action on papers of the Central Intelligence Group to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval or comment.

f. That when appropriate in connection with current problems being considered by the Joint Intelligence Committee, they should request the assistance of the Central Intelligence Group.

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ENCLOSURE "B"

4 September 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Establishment of a Channel between C.I.G.  
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

REFERENCE: a. Memorandum from Chief of Naval Intelligence to  
Director of Central Intelligence, same subject,  
dated 22 August 1946, No. Or-32X.  
b. N.I.A. Directive No. 1.

It is fully agreed that the present undetermined relationship between the C.I.G. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff requires early and comprehensive consideration.

It is not considered, however, that the proposal contained in the reference memorandum is appropriate since, pursuant to N.I.A. Directive No. 1, the Central Intelligence Group is constituted as a cooperative interdepartmental activity in which the interests of the State, War and Navy Departments are adequately and equitably represented. In addition, a full time staff for the Intelligence Advisory Board is not considered desirable since it implies that the I.A.B. must act unanimously as a body, whereas N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides that, if any member of the I.A.B. does not concur in a recommendation, it may nevertheless be submitted to the N.I.A. for decision.

It is, therefore, requested that, instead of pressing for the adoption by the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Intelligence Advisory Board of the recommendations contained in the reference memorandum, the Chief of Naval Intelligence sponsor a recommendation that each of those bodies concur that the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff of C.I.G. and the Joint Intelligence Staff conduct a prompt and comprehensive joint study of the problem with recommendations for solution.

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Enclosure "B"

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The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff of the C.I.G. is being directed to assemble such material as may be currently available to it in preparation for such a joint study in all of its aspects.

HOYT S. VANDENBERG  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Director of Central Intelligence.

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Enclosure "B"

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ENCLOSURE "C"

NAVY DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS  
WASHINGTON

11 September 1946

From: Chief of Naval Intelligence.  
To: Director of Central Intelligence.  
Subject: Establishment of a Channel Between CIG and the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
Reference: (a) DCI Memo re above Subject, dated 4 Sept. 1945.

1. The second paragraph of reference (a) is not fully understood. A "full time staff for I.A.B." was not suggested in my proposal; the Joint Intelligence Staff would act as such only part time and in addition to their present duties. My purpose is to provide a direct link, on the working level, between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Intelligence Authority. Present representation on C.I.G. is not questioned. Nor was any implication intended that unanimous action of the I.A.B. is required. It has always been understood that split opinions of the I.A.B. must be referred to N.I.A. for decision.

2. Your recommendation that the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff of the C.I.G. and the Joint Intelligence Staff conduct a prompt and comprehensive joint study of the problem and make recommendations for solution has merit. However, it is not desired to delay to that extent the discussion of this problem before the I.A.B. and the Joint Intelligence Committee. The present paper does not call for a vote on the proposed solution but for discussion of the problem. At that time it was expected that any member of the I.A.B. (including the Director of Central Intelligence) would present any other solution which he preferred over that proposed. If the first discussion of this problem is before the Joint Intelligence Committee I would be

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pleased to recommend to them that you be invited to attend and present your views. Or, if you prefer, I would be pleased to present to the Joint Intelligence Committee your views and preferred solution.

3. The Joint Intelligence Staff has already formally circulated my suggestion to the Joint Intelligence Committee. I prefer to let my suggestion to the I.A.B. stand and again request that it be included on the agenda for the next meeting of the I.A.B.

/s/ THOS. B. INGLIS.

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Enclosure "C"



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18 September 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Relationship of the NIA  
and CIG to the JCS and JIC

Admiral Inglis, in a memorandum dated 22 August, requested discussion at the next IAB meeting of a report which proposed that the Joint Intelligence Staff be designated as the Intelligence Advisory Staff of the IAB in order to establish a channel between CIG and JCS.

By memorandum dated 4 September you expressed the belief that Admiral Inglis' proposal was inappropriate, primarily because it injected another agency between you and the IAB. You proposed that ICAPS and JIS conduct a joint study of the problem.

On 11 September Admiral Inglis, while agreeing that your proposal had merit, reaffirmed his request for discussion at the next IAB meeting to avoid delay.

ICAPS and the undersigned have now developed a proposal for consideration by the IAB in lieu of Admiral Inglis' proposal. The new proposal establishes you as chief intelligence adviser to the JCS, subject to the direction and control of NIA and with the advice and assistance of JIC. The relationship between you and JIC on JCS matters is identical with that now existing between you and IAB on NIA matters. The Secretariats of NIA and JIC are merged, and it is provided that the present JIC subcommittees, including JIS, will either be integrated into CIG or operate under your coordination. The JIC would continue as the U. S. members of the Combined Intelligence Committee but would coordinate such activities with you.

It is recommended that:

- a. The previous correspondence with Admiral Inglis be circulated immediately to the IAB for discussion at their next meeting.
- b. Members of ICAPS be authorized to discuss the new proposal described above with the assistants to the IAB members in an effort to reach agreement, on a staff level, on all possible points prior to the IAB meeting.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.  
Secretary, N.I.A.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: September 12, 1946

FROM : Acting Chief, Interdepartmental Coordinating  
and Planning Staff

SUBJECT: Relationship between the JCS and CIG; Proposed Plan of.

- Reference: a. Memorandum from Director of Naval Intelligence to Director of Central Intelligence, subject: Establishment of a channel between CIG and the JCS; dated 22 August 1946, No. OP-32X.
- b. Memorandum from Director of Central Intelligence to Director of Naval Intelligence, same subject, dated 4 September 1946.

1. Although not yet received, it is understood that the Director of Naval Intelligence reply to reference b stated that although the proposal for joint study by ICAPS and the JIS has merit, this study should not delay action by either the IAB or JIC in establishing a channel between CIG and the JCS. Therefore, under the assumption that this problem will be settled by either the JIC or IAB with participation by the Director of Central Intelligence, the following suggestions are submitted as the proposal of ICAPS for consideration by the Director in offering to either activity a concrete plan.

2. First, that Paragraph 2 of NIA No. 1 which states, "The Central Intelligence Group will furnish strategic and national policy intelligence to the President and the State, War and Navy Departments, and, as appropriate, to the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other governmental departments and agencies having strategic and policy functions related to the national security," be construed that the Director of Central Intelligence, supported by the participating federal intelligence agencies, is the chief intelligence advisor to the JCS acting under the direction of the NIA, and that he should sit with the JCS, as he does with the NIA, as a non-voting member.

3. Second, that the JIC and the IAB (which have the same membership) so merge their activities that they will concurrently serve both the JCS and the NIA. That their secretariats also be merged to insure coordination of JCS and NIA considerations in appropriate cases; this combined secretariat to be composed of JCS and NIA sections to facilitate proper presentation to the two authorities and to permit such separation of decisions as may from time to time be desirable in the national interest.

4. Third, that the present sub-committees of the JIC together with the JIS be combined with the CIG so as to create the most

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compact and efficient organization competent to meet the intelligence requirements of the JCS and the NIA. Such combination would not preclude the maintenance within the CIG framework of such special functions as the IAB on the request of the JCS might designate as solely to serve the JCS.

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DONALD EDGAR

CONFIDENTIAL

4 September 1946

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

**Subject:** Establishment of a Channel between C.I.G. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff

**Reference:** a. Memorandum from Chief of Naval Intelligence to Director of Central Intelligence, same Subject, dated 22 August 1946, No. Op-321.  
b. N.I.A. Directive No. 1

It is fully agreed that the present undetermined relationship between the C.I.G. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff requires early and comprehensive consideration.

It is not considered, however, that the proposal contained in the reference memorandum is appropriate since, pursuant to N.I.A. Directive No. 1, the Central Intelligence Group is constituted as a cooperative interdepartmental activity in which the interests of the State, War and Navy Departments are adequately and equitably represented. In addition, a full time staff for the Intelligence Advisory Board is not considered desirable since it implies that the I.A.B. must act unanimously as a body, whereas N.I.A. Directive No. 1 provides that, if any member of the I.A.B. does not concur in a recommendation, it may nevertheless be submitted to the N.I.A. for decision.

It is, therefore, requested that, instead of pressing for the adoption by the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Intelligence Advisory Board of the recommendations contained in the reference memorandum, the Chief of Naval Intelligence sponsor a recommendation that each of those bodies concur that the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff of C.I.G. and the Joint Intelligence Staff conduct a prompt and comprehensive joint study of the problem with recommendations for solution.

The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff of the C.I.G. is being directed to assemble such material as may be currently available to it in preparation for such a joint study in all of its aspects.

**"SIGNED"**

HOYT S. VANDENBERG  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Director of Central Intelligence

cc to: General Chamberlin  
General McDonald  
Colonel Eddy

Central Records (2)  
Executive Registry  
ICAPS  
Return to Mr. Fay